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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Article with regard to rights, obligations and remedies applies whether title
to collateral is in the secured party or in the debtor."5 9) If title is immaterial
for the purposes of article 9, the traditional ground for distinguishing the
conditional sale from other security interests is abolished. Although "this
Article in no way determines which line of interpretation (title theory v. lien
theory or retained title v. conveyed title) should be followed in cases where the
applicability of some other rule of law depends upon who has title,"0 0 Lake's
Laundry was concerned not with "some other rule of law," but with the condi-
tional sale as security. The parties in Lake's Laundry did not ask the court to
decide the issue of title for the purpose of assessing taxes or of determining
who can vote certain stock,"' but to decide whether a conditional vendor bad
the right to reclaim his security when other secured creditors were stayed. This
precise problem occupied the attention of the Code's official commentators who
advised that "since this Article adopts neither a 'title' nor a 'lien' theory of
security interests . .. the granting or denying of, for example, petitions of
reclamation in bankruptcy proceedings should not be influenced by specula-
tions as to whether the secured party had 'title' to the collateral or 'merely a
lien.' "02
Since bankruptcy courts must consult state law to determine the quality of
the interests before them, those courts which blindly follow Lake's Laundry
will find themselves in an anomalous position as proponents of a rule derived
from a distinction between conditional sales and other forms of security, a dis-
tinction no longer viable in a security context. Patently, the rule cannot survive
without the distinction; the distinction being dead, the rule should soon follow.
WAGE EARNER BANKRUPTCY: A NEGLECTED REMEDY?
I. INTRODUCTION
Two bills introduced in Congress' to amend the Bankruptcy Act reflect the
belief that wider use of wage earner bankruptcy proceedings2 may provide at
least a partial solution to the problems which have accompanied the enormous
59. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-202. (Emphasis added.)
60. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-202, comment 1.
61. These are the examples given in ibid.
62. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-507, comment 1. (Emphasis added.) This section Is
entitled "Secured Party's Liability for Failure To Comply With This Part," and deals with
the power of the court to dispose of or restrain the disposition of the secured property.
The comment to § 9-202 refers to this comment for the Code's treatment of the Lake's
Laundry situation.
1. S. 613, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) ; H.R. 292, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). The bills
are discussed at notes 90-93 infra and accompanying text.
2. Bankruptcy Act §§ 601-86, 52 Stat. 930 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-86
(1964).
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rise in consumer credit.3 Under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act,4 which
benefits both insolvent5 wage earners and their creditors, 7 the debtor9 devises a
plan, by the terms of which a specified portion of his future wages v.ill be set
aside for payment of his creditors.0 Such debtor, harassed by creditors, but never-
theless seeking to avoid voluntary bankruptcy proceedings,10 may file a petition
stating a desire to effect either a composition or an extension of his debts." A
composition plan contemplates only partial payment of debts,2 while an exten-
3. See Bobier, Chapter =XII-Mecca or Mirage, 32 Detroit Laiv. 25 (1964); Driver,
Proposal-To Amend the Bankruptcy Act To Require That Consideration Be Given to the
Use of Chapter XIII, IS Pers. Fin. L.Q. 41 (1964); Tinem, Reduce Unnece:=ry Perzonal
Bankruptcies: Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 23 Legal Aid Brief Case 252 (1965). The rise
in consumer credit, absolutely and relative to the average family's before-tax income, is
noted in Driver, supra at 42. The problems attendant upon the increased ue of credit
facilities affect both the creditor and the debtor. The debtor often finds himself pre-ently
unable to meet his financial obligations. Creditors, especially unsecured creditors, loze
millions of dollars each year when wage earners with no aets obtain a discharge in bank-
ruptcy. Ibid.
4. Referees in Birmingham, Alabama and Chicago, Illinois had attempted to adapt the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1S93 to fit the needs of wage earners. National Bank-
ruptcy Conference, Analysis of H.R. 128S9, 74th Cong., 2d Se s. 102 (Comm. Print 1936).
5. Bankruptcy Act § 623, 52 Stat. 932 (1933), 11 US.C. § 1023 (1964), provides that
the petition shall "state that the debtor is insolvent or unable to pay his debts as they
mature. . . ." This section encompasses two criteria of insolvency. Benson, Wage Earner
Plans in Bankruptcy Court, Mlich. St. Bj., Aug. 1962, pp. 10, 11.
6. Bankruptcy Act § 606(S), 73 Stat. 24 (1959), 11 U.S.C. § 1006(S) (1954), defines a
wage earner as anyone "whose principal income is derived from wage, slary or commis-
sions." Wage earners under Chapter I were originally limited to persons earning z3,C0
or less per year. Bankruptcy Act § 606(3), ch. 575, 52 Stat. 931 (1933). In 1950, the ceiling
was raised to $5,000. Bankruptcy Act § 606(S), ch. 1193, 64 Stat. 1134 (1950). In 1959,
all monetary ceiling was removed. Bankruptcy Act § 606(3), 73 Stat. 24 (1959), 11 U.S.C.
§ 1006(3) (1964).
7. The intent to afford relief to harassed wage earners is noted by Chandler, The Wage
Earners' Plan: Its Purpose, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 169 (1961). The benefit to the unsecured
creditors is the opportunity to have access to the future wages of the debtor.
8. Chapter XIII refers to a participant as a "debtor" rather than a "bankrupt" and
allows wage earners to avoid the stigma attached to bankruptcy. Nadler, The Law of
Bankruptcy § 311, at 632 (2d ed. 1965).
9. A great deal of literature has been published on the proceedings and the forms to be
used in filing a Chapter XIII plan. See, e.g., Hilliard & Hurt, Wage Earner Plans Under
Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, 19 Bus. Law. 271 (1963); Sloan, Wage Earner.' Plan,
33 Ref. J. 5 (1959); Comment, 45 Mlarq. L. Rev. 532 (1962).
10. Bankruptcy Act § 4a, 52 Stat. 345 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 22(a) (1964), provides that
any natural person is entitled to the benefits of a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding. Section
4b includes wage earners among those who are not subject to involuntary bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, but the definition of a "wage earner" within the meaning of § 4 is limited to a
person making less than $1,500 per year. Bankruptcy Act § 1(32), 52 Stat. 342 (1933),
11 U.S.C. § 1(32) (1964).
11. Bankruptcy Act § 623, 52 Stat. 932 (1933), 11 U.S.C. § 1023 (1964).
12. In the Matter of Alahaley, 137 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
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sion plan has as its goal the full satisfaction of debts, albeit not within the time
originally scheduled for payment.'3
After the filing of the petition, a meeting of creditors is called, at which the
debtor will submit a plan which must "deal with"' 4 all unsecured creditors
equally, and which may deal with any secured creditors individually. A major-
ity in number and amount of all unsecured creditors, and any secured creditors
who are dealt with by the plan, must then ratify the debtor's proposal,10 after
which the court grants confirmation and appoints a trustee to receive and distri-
bute future wages. 17
The proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Act constitute an attempt to
generate more general and uniform acceptance of wage earner plans by compel-
ling applicants for a voluntary discharge to consider the possibility of a Chapter
XIII plan.' 8 The amendments are, however, devoid of any consideration of
problems which have arisen in the interpretation and application of certain
statutory provisions.
II. THE "Six YEAR DISCHARGE" PROBLEMS
Under Section 14c(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, a discharge in bankruptcy will
not be granted if, within six years of the current proceeding, the applicant has
"been granted a discharge, or had ... a wage earner's plan by way of composi-
tion confirmed.. .,19 While the meaning of confirmation of a composition plan
13. Ibid.
14. Problems have arisen construing the phrase "deal with." See note 60 infra.
15. Bankruptcy Act § 646, 52 Stat. 934 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1046 (1964). "Claims" under
Chapter XIII do not include "claims secured by estates in real property." Bankruptcy Act
§ 606(1), 52 Stat. 930 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1006(1) (1964). Judicial interpretation of this
section is discussed in note 67 infra.
16. Bankruptcy Act § 652(1), 52 Stat. 934 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1052(1) (1964).
17. Upon confirmation, the court is vested with broad powers to aid the wage earner
in effectively executing the provisions of the plan. The court has jurisdiction over all prop-
erty of the debtor and control of all wage assignments. Bankruptcy Act § 658(1), 52 Stat.
935 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1058(1) (1964). The court may permit rejection of executory
contracts. Bankruptcy Act § 646(6), 52 Stat. 934 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1046(6) (1964). The
court, with reasonable cause, may also stay enforcement of liens on property of the debtor.
Bankruptcy Act § 614, 52 Stat. 931 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1014 (1964).
18. The amendments are discussed at notes 90-93 infra and accompanying text. The use
of wage earner bankruptcy has been increasing. See U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical
Abstract 508 (1965). Advocates of the plan believe that the number of Chapter XIII plans
is low compared to the number of wage earners who invoke straight bankruptcy proceedings.
E.g., Twinem, supra note 3, at 256. Mr. Twinem found that only 18% of total personal
bankrupts filed Chapter XIII petitions in 1964, and that the relative use of that chapter
has not increased since 1957. Ibid. But many bankruptcy statistics may be misleading. See
Brunner, Personal Bankruptcies: Trends and Characteristics 17-24 (1965). The degree of
acceptance of Chapter XIII has not been uniform among the different sections of the
country. Driver, supra note 3, at 44. See generally McDuffee, The Wage Earner's Plan In
Practice, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 173 (1961).
19. Bankruptcy Act § 14c(5), 66 Stat. 422 (1952), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(5)
(1964). Section 14c lists seven specific offenses, any one of which will act as a bar to dis-
[Vol. 34
6]COMMENTS
is clear enough, the meaning of "discharge" is not. The definition of discharge
appearing in the act is "the release of a bankrupt from all of his debts which are
provable in bankruptcy, except such as are excepted by this Act .... "o This
is, obviously, the intended result of a straight bankruptcy proceeding.-2 1 In the
case of a Chapter XIII proceeding, however, a distinction must be made be-
tween composition and extension plans. The former is similar to a straight bank-
ruptcy proceeding insofar as it contemplates a discharge; the latter contemplates
merely an extension of time, within which full payment can be made. Therefore,
where the debtor has completed payments under an extension plan, the use of
the word "discharge" is improper since there is no release from indebtedness.2
Because this distinction, simple as it is, has not alway been recognized, courts
have not been consistent in determining when prior bankruptcy relief bars sub-
sequent confirmation of an extension plan, or when a prior extension plan acts
as a bar to subsequent relief. The problem could be resolved by refusing to
classify every completed extension as the equivalent of a discharge.24 A further
distinction would then have to be made between completed and terminated ex-
tensions. A completed extension is one which ends when all payments required
under the plan have been made. A terminated extension is one which ends with
a release of indebtedness prior to the completion of all payments and, therefore,
charge. However, this section is applicable to Chapter XIII only where "not inconsistent or
in conflict" with the provisions of that chapter. Bankruptcy Act § 602, 52 Stat 930 (1938), 11
U.S.C. § 102 (1964). For example, in one case concerning a wage earner plan, the court found
that the United States was not entitled to priority on its claim for overpayment of "ag, as
provided under Bankruptcy Act § 64a(5), 52 Slat. 874 (1933), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (5) (1964),
since this would be in conflict with the avowed intent of treating all unsecured creditors as
a class under Chapter XIII. In the Matter of Bailey, 183 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ala. 196-0).
20. Bankruptcy Act § 1(15), 52 Slat. 841 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1(15) (1964).
21. "The adjudication of any person . . . shall operate as an application for a dis-
charge ... ." Bankruptcy Act § 14a, 52 Slat. S30 (1933), 11 US.C. § 32(a) (1964).
22. A debtor may apply, after the expiration of three years, for a discharge from all debts
provided for under the plan but not yet liquidated. Bankruptcy Act § 661, 66 Slat. 437
(1952), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1964). Thus, the court has the power to grant an
actual discharge, even where the proposed plan originally contemplated merely an extension
of time in which to make payments. The court has discretionary power to determine under
what circumstances a debtor will be discharged. 10 Collier, Bankruptcy 9 29.11, at 355
(14th ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Collier]. While there is no specific provision limiting
wage earner plans to three years, for practical reasons most plans do not exceed this limit.
See Nadler, op. cit. supra note 8, § 836, at 693.
23. A court will not confirm a plan unless satisfied that "the debtor has not been guilty
of any of the acts or failed to perform any of the duties which would be a bar to the dis-
charge . ... " Bankruptcy Act § 656a(3), 66 Slat. 437 (1952), 11 US.C. § 1056(a)(3) (1964).
24. See In the Matter of Sharp, 205 F. Supp. 7S6 (W.D. Mo. 1962). Noting the conflicting
decisions, the court found that § 14c(5) was "not applicable to those provisions of Chapter
XIII which authorize the approval of an extension plan for the debtor." Id. at 7&9. Accord,
In the Matter of Alaaley, 187 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Cal. 19C0). Here, the court found that
the purpose of § 14c(5) was to prevent habitual recourse by persons seeking release of their
obligations, while the purpose of Chapter XIII was to assist honest wage earners in paying
their debts. Id. at 231.
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is similar to a discharge 2 5 Completed extensions, therefore, should not bar sub-
sequent relief; nor should confirmation of an extension plan be barred by a prior
discharge of indebtedness. Congress, in specifying that composition, but not
extension, plans were to bar subsequent discharge, clearly intended to distinguish
between the two types of plans, the distinguishing feature being the full pay-
ment of debts under an extension 2 6
A. Prior Discharge in Bankruptcy
Two court of appeals' decisions, however, have refused to consider extensions
a distinct form of bankruptcy relief. In the Matter of Perry27 found that the
"plain language of the Act" precluded confirmation of a plan where there had
been a discharge within six years, and the fact that the proposed plan merely
sought an extension of time in which to pay debts was deemed immaterial.2 8
The court did not discuss the possibility that section 14c(5) is "inconsistent or
in conflict" 29 with the extension provisions of Chapter XIII, nor did it concede
any distinction between composition and extension plans.30 In the Matter of
Schlageter,3' reaching the same conclusion as Perry, reasoned that both types of
wage earner plans create at least the possibility of a discharge of unpaid debts
and, for this reason, an "extension" is sufficiently analogous to a subsequent
"discharge" to come within the limitation of section 14c(5).182 The Schlageter
rationale is relevant where a debtor is actually seeking "termination" of an ex-
tension plan. It is not relevant, however, where a debtor is merely seeking con-
firmation of an extension plan, which plan, at the outset, contemplates full
payment.33
In the Matter of Binghan,34 a district court case, also ignored the distinction,
25. See note 22 supra.
26. National Bankruptcy Conference, Analysis of H.R. 12889, supra note 4, at 121.
27. 340 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1965) (per curiam), rev'd sub nor. Perry v. Commerce Loan
Co., 34 U.S.L. Week 4190 (U.S. March 7, 1966).
28. 340 F.2d at 589.
29. See note 19 supra.
30. The court stated that, if extension plans are to be exempted from the provisions of
the Bankruptcy Act, Congress, and not the courts, should so provide. 340 F.2d at 589. The
court noted a proposal by the National Bankruptcy Conference which would amend the
act to allow extension plans to be treated distinctly. Ibid.
31. 319 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1963).
32. 319 F.2d at 823; accord, In the Matter of Fontan, 227 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Miss.
1964); In the Matter of Nicholson, 224 F. Supp. 773 (D. Ore. 1963). For a discussion of
extension plans which may result in a discharge of indebtedness, see note 22 supra.
33. See text accompanying notes 25 & 26 supra. Therefore, completed extensions should not
preclude subsequent Chapter XIII relief of either form, composition or extension, since the
debtor would not have been guilty of any acts which would be a bar to discharge. Nor
would a composition be a bar to confirmation of a subsequent extension since § 14c(S) Is
inapplicable to extensions. A composition would bar a subsequent composition since this
would be the equivalent of two discharges within six years.
34. 190 F. Supp. 219 (D. Kan. 1960), appeal dismissed on other grounds sub nom.
Bingham v. Yingling Chevrolet Co., 297 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1961), 47 Iowa L. Rev. 155.
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and concluded that the confirmation of one wage earner plan was a bar to a
subsequent extension plan within six years. Another case, In the Matter of
Autry,35 allowing two extensions within six years, attempted to reconcile Bing-
ham by assuming that the first plan in that case "was by way of composition." '
Autry, however, failed to consider the possibility that section 14c(S) is totally
inapplicable to the confirmation of an extension plan and that, therefore, the
nature of the prior plan should in all cases be irrelevant.3 7
In its attempt to reconcile the Bingham decision, Autry misinterpreted that
court's holding, for Bingham did not consider extension plans unique, and im-
plied that, since both compositions and extensions are equivalent to discharge,
they would bar subsequent remedies. 3s The court, in Bingham, found that
creditors' interests merited protection, not only from incomplete payments, but
also from conversion of "credit risks desirable for one year to extensions of
credit over three or four years, with resultant loss." ' 9 The "loss" considered by
the court resulted from secured creditors being required to delay collection while
their security depreciated. With respect to the application of section 14c(5) to
Chapter XIII, Bingham therefore indicated that an extension plan is sufficiently
adverse to the interests of certain creditors to be equivalent to a discharge. Re-
gardless of the merit of the court's argument, the specific congressional intent
to treat extensions as sti generis4 ° cannot be overlooked and, if any additional
protection is to be afforded to creditors, it should be provided by statutory revi-
sion and not by the courts.
B. Subsequent Discharge in Bankruptcy
Confirmation of a Chapter XIII extension plan should not bar a subsequent
discharge in voluntary bankruptcy. Furthermore, it should be immaterial whether
the subsequent voluntary petition is filed either after completion of the exten-
sion plan or, where necessary, during its pendency. In re Thompson 1 held that
the completion of an extension did not bar a subsequent discharge in straight
bankruptcy. The court, applying the expressio unius maxim,42 noted that section
14c(5) specifically mentioned the confirmation of a wage earner composition
plan, but omitted any reference to an extension planPA The statutory language
is certainly strong support for the court's position.
35. 204 F. Supp. 820 (D. Kan. 1962). Accord, In the Matter of HolmLs, 309 F2d 74S
(10th Cir. 1962).
36. 204 F. Supp. at S21. Actually, it is inferable that Bingham concerned a prior extension
plan. The first wage earner plan covered a period of only 17 months. 190 F. Supp. at 220. A
court would probably require a debtor to attempt an extension plan of at least three years
before allowing a composition and a resulting release of indebtedness in a leszer period.
37. See text accompanying notes 20-26 supra.
38. 190 F. Supp. at 220-21.
39. Id. at 221.
40. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
41. 51 F. Supp. 12 (WI). Va. 1943).
42. Id. at 14. As a rule of statutory construction, the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another. In re Wilkins, 49 Cal. App. 2d 709, 712, 122 P2d 361, 362 (1942).
43. 51 F. Supp. at 14.
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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The court noted, additionally, the payment-in-full distinction between exten-
sion and composition plans.4 4 While this distinction is certainly relevant, the
court must first look to the manner in which the extension plan was terminated.
If the plan were successfully completed, there would be no bar to a subsequent
discharge within six years. However, if the extension plan were not completed,
but, rather, ended in discharge,45 a subsequent application for discharge, made
within six years, should be denied.
As a result of two decisions, it appears that the right to a discharge in straight
bankruptcy, while in the midst of a Chapter XIII plan, is contingent upon the
point in time during the plan when the application is filed.40 One court has held
that, if the application is filed prior to default under the plan, the referee has
the discretionary power to grant a discharge. 47 In another case, it was held
that, if the debtor has already defaulted in payments under the plan, the debtor
has a statutory right to convert to voluntary bankruptcy.48 The court in the
latter case reasoned that, once a debtor had been encouraged to undertake an
extension plan rather than to invoke voluntary bankruptcy proceedings, it would
be "repugnant to the philosophy" of the court and "would substantially destroy
the attraction" of Chapter XIII to compel a defaulting wage earner to maintain
payments against his will. 49
These two decisions indicate that a debtor, having grown weary of the burdens
of Chapter XIII relief, could unilaterally discard his wage earner plan by de-
faulting. However, the court has the power to prevent a debtor from defaulting
and, thus, invoking his right to straight bankruptcy. The court can compel
employers to cooperate in implementing a plan"0 and can adjust payments,
where necessary, to meet the needs of the debtor.51 Reasonable concern for the
interests of the creditors, coupled with an understanding that the wage earner
has assumed the more arduous of possible bankruptcy remedies by choosing
Chapter XIII, will enable the court to reach an equitable decision as to when
a debtor under a wage earner plan can invoke voluntary bankruptcy.
C. Resolution
Generally speaking, with respect to any problems which may arise under the
six year statutory prohibition, a debtor should know with certainty, when
electing his bankruptcy relief, what other remedies will be available to him.
Since many debts are not discharged in straight bankruptcy,52 a debtor, having
44. Ibid.
45. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
46. Bankruptcy Act § 668, 52 Stat. 936 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1068 (1964), provides that a
wage earner cannot be adjudicated a bankrupt while under a Chapter XIII plan. But this
section merely exempts the debtor from involuntary proceedings. See Rice v. Mimms, 291
F.2d 823, 825-26 & n.7 (10th Cir. 1961).
47. Id. at 826.
48. In the Matter of Hendren, 240 F. Supp. 807, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1965).
49. Ibid.
50. Bankruptcy Act § 658(2), 52 Stat. 935 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1058(2) (1964).
51. Bankruptcy Act § 646(5), 52 Stat. 934 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1046(5) (1964).
52. Bankruptcy Act § 17a, 52 Stat. 851 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1964),
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been previously discharged, may, in some jurisdictions, find himself harassed
by creditors with no avenue of relief open to him.ra And, while no case has held
that an extension plan is a bar to a subsequent discharge, the Bingham reason-
ing, indicating that a prior extension was a bar to further Chapter XIII relief
within six years, could be used to support such a holding. This would lead to
the undesirable result that a prior extension would also be a bar to the more
drastic remedy of straight bankruptcy. A debtor should be informed of this
possibility before he elects to proceed under Chapter XIII.
A former participant in an extension plan may also find himself without
available bankruptcy relief where he receives an actual discharge from indebted-
ness after three years under section 661.5 In such a case, the extension plan
would not have resulted in full payment, and a court could justly conclude that
section 14c(5) does act as a bar to subsequent relief.
Amendments have been proposed to clarify a debtor's right to an extension
regardless of past remedies.? Such clarification, while necessary, should be
accompanied by some restraints to prevent habitual users from gaining the
protection of the courts under Chapter XIII and a subsequent discharge of
indebtedness under section 661. Courts should treat a "discharge" of indebted-
ness under that section as equivalent to a discharge under section 14c(S). Such
discharge would be a bar to all subsequent bankruptcy remedies except the mere
confirmation of an extension plan. Such discharge would also be barred by any
prior bankruptcy relief except a consumnmated extension plan.
III. SECURED CREDITORS' LiENs
The drafters of Chapter XIII intended that the provisions of a wage earner
plan be "suited to the circumstances of the... parties to be affected thereby.";;O
Some recent cases indicate that in certain instances it may be impossible to
reconcile the needs of the insolvent wage earner with the rights of secured
creditors.57 Theoretically, a secured creditor has the option of rejecting a pro-
posed plan and either filing a reclamation petition or commencing a foreclosure
action.S Courts, exercising their power to enjoin the enforcement of a lien on
the property of a Chapter XIII participant,'O have, in effect, compelled secured
lists six specific debts which are not released by discharge, including taxes and unscheduled
debts.
53. Some lawyers, assuming that an extension will not be a bar, recommend that their
clients attempt an extension plan to avoid the possibility of being barred from needed relief
after obtaining a discharge. Rodkey, A Need for fore Wage Earner Plans in Non-Business
Bankruptcy Cases in Illinois, 53 Ill. B.J. 324, 330 (1964).
54. Bankruptcy Act § 661, 52 Stat. 936 (193S), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 1051 (1964).
55. In the Matter of Perry, 340 F.2d -8S (6th Cir. 1965) (per curiam), cert. granted,
3S2 U.S. SS9 (1965); 47 Iowa L. Rev. 155, 161 (1961).
56. National Bankruptcy Conference, Analysis of H.R. 12SS9, 74th Cong., 2d S 0f. &
n.1 (Comm. Print 1936).
57. See notes 61-67 infra and accompanying text.
58. If the security is repossessed, the value of the chattel is applied to the debt and the
creditor is treated as unsecured for any deficiency. See Hilliard & Hurt, supra note 9, at 279.
59. Generally, the lien sought to be enforced will be a purchase money security intest,
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creditors to participate in wage earner plans. Where such enforcement was
denied, the rights of the creditor were nevertheless protected: the trustee made
payments to the creditor in an amount sufficient to protect his interest.00
Those courts which have denied reclamation petitions have indicated that
the rights of the secured creditor must not be substantially impaired thereby.01
What constitutes substantial impairment, however, is not certain. An early case
held that a rejecting secured creditor who was denied his reclamation rights was
entitled to regular payments as called for in the contract. 2 The court did not,
however, require the debtor to make provision for immediate satisfaction of three
payments in arrears,63 and, thus, for all practical purposes, the creditor was made
an involuntary participant in an extension for the three overdue payments.
Another case indicated an intent to allow smaller payments than those provided
for under the contract.64 More recent cases speak of payment "according to the
in which case the creditor is seeking reclamation of his security rather than foreclosure. The
court has the power both to deny reclamation and to stay foreclosure actions. Bankruptcy
Act § 614, 52 Stat. 931 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1014 (1964); Hallenbeck v. Penn Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 323 F.2d 566, 572-74 (4th Cir. 1963).
60. Abramson, The Wage Earner's Plan Under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, in
Creditors' Rights in Texas 607, 612 (1963). An application for confirmation may not be
filed unless the proposed arrangement has been accepted "by the secured creditors whose
claims are dealt with by the plan . . . ." Bankruptcy Act § 652(1), 52 Stat. 934 (1938), 11
U.S.C. § 1052(1) (1964). There are three ways in which a secured creditor may be "dealt
with" under Chapter XIII. The creditor may accept the provisions of the plan and receive
payment as provided thereunder. He may reject the plan but be denied his reclamation right
under § 614. In this case, courts have ignored the necessity for written acceptance. See In
the Matter of Clevenger, 282 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1960) ; In re Duncan, 33 F. Supp. 997 (E.D.
Va. 1940). A third view is that every secured creditor is "dealt with" whenever his reclama-
tion rights are subject to the court's injunctive powers. Based on this reasoning, a court has
found that a plan cannot be confirmed over the objection of the rejecting creditor. In the
Matter of O'Dell, 198 F. Supp. 389 (D. Kan. 1961). All the distinctions are purely academic
since the court can, in any case, deny reclamation and, in effect, "deal with" a secured creditor
without his acceptance. The more essential issue, confused by the courts in their discussion
of the acceptance requirements, is the amount which must be paid to a secured creditor when
foreclosure is, in fact, denied.
The National Bankruptcy Conference has suggested an amendment which would overrule
O'Dell's finding that written acceptance is required in all cases. Under the amendment, the
rejecting creditor would be deemed excluded from the plan, in order to avoid the necessity
of going through the motions of filing a new plan excluding the rejecting creditor. Comment,
63 Mich. L. Rev. 1449, 1453 (1965).
61. In re Duncan, 33 F. Supp. 997 (ED. Va. 1940); cf. In the Matter of Wilder, 225
F. Supp. 67 (M.D. Ga. 1963), where the issue was confirmation of a wage earner plan over
the objection of a secured creditor. The ultimate result, however, would be denial of reclama-
tion rights. See note 60 supra.
62. In re Duncan, supra note 61. The court based its decision on three factors: the creditor
had acquiesced in prior defaults; the debtor had acquired substantial equity in the security;
and the position of the secured creditor was not substantially impaired. Id. at 998-99.
63. Id. at 998.
64. In the Matter of Clevenger, 282 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1960). The court stated that a
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terms of the instrument creating the debt '" '0 or "contract benefits"10 as the
tests of substantial impairment. These cases would deny to the court any discre-
tion to stay reclamation petitions unless provision is made for full current pay-
ments.67 And, while these cases did not involve overdue payments, if the term
"contract benefits" includes the right to recover security upon default in pay-
ment, not only full current payments but immediate satisfaction of all overdue
installments would also be required.
The standard by which sufficient payment is to be measured will often deter-
mine whether Chapter NIM relief will be available to a particular wage earner.
Prospective participants will frequently be unable to pay both overdue and full
current payments on property which is necessary to a successful rehabilitation
program. A solution has been suggested for those cases in which the security
is exempt property, 3 There is authority that holders of exempt security are
precluded from enforcing their liens and are to be treated as unsecured credi-
tors.6 9 The problem with this solution is that the debtor would have to rely on
state exemption statutes to enable him to retain the necessary property.70 In
Kansas, for example, automobiles are exempt property.71 But, in certain states,
automobiles are not exempt,72 and a debtor who requires the use of an auto-
mobile to drive to and from work would be unable to find adequate relief in a
Chapter XII proceeding. This was not the intent of the drafters, who indicated,
trustee, having assumed the debtor's executory contracts, must male payments to a rejecting
secured creditor "if pozible, in an amount at least as large as was called for in the purchasa
contracts." Id. at 757.
65. In the Matter of O'Dell, 193 F. Supp. 3S9, 391 (D. 7an. 1961).
66. In the Matter of Copes, 206 F. Supp. 329, 330 (D. Ran. 1962).
67. The same test of substantial impairment has been applied, i.e., full payment, where
courts have denied foreclosure of liens on real property. Although provi ion cannot be made
in a plan for payment of debts secured by real property, courts can stay foreclosure so long
as the debtor continues to make payment according to the original contract terms. Hallenbeck
v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963); In the Matter of Garrett, 203
F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Ala. 1962).
63. Lee, There Is Still Hope for the Wage Earners' Plans, 36 Ref. J. 125 (1962). A debtor
under Chapter II is entitled to exemptions in a like manner as a banlupt. Bankruptcy Act
§ 637, 52 Stat. 933 (1933), 11 U.S.C. § 1037 (1964). But this provision has not been utilized
in denying reclamation petitions. See cases cited note 61 supra.
69. See 1 Collier f1 1.23, at 130.3. For a discussion of a situation where a secured creditor
was denied foreclosure on exempt property, see Lee, Who Is a Secured Creditor in Wage
Earner Proceedings?, 3S Ref. J. 44 (1964).
70. Federal statutes govern a limited number of exemptions. 1 Collier 6.17. The
primary source of exemptions is state statutes. 1 id. f 6.03, at 797.
71. Kan. Rev. Stat. § 60-3504 (1923) (now Kan. Stat. Ann. § C0-2304(6) (1(64))
provides an exemption from seizure and attachment of "one wagon, cart or dray." This has
been interpreted to include an automobile. Foster v. Foster, 144 Kan. 523, 61 P2d 1350
(1936).
72. Statutes similar to the Kansas exemption have been interpreted not to include auto-
mobiles. Young v. Wright, 77 Idaho 244, 290 P.2d 10S6 (1955); Prater v. Riechman, 135
Tenn. 485, 137 S.W. 305 (1916).
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by stating that the relevant statutes were designed to provide equitable relief
suited to the particular circumstances of the parties,73 that wage earner relief
should not be contingent upon the vagaries of state exemption laws.
To require categorically full satisfaction for secured creditors would be in
keeping with the intent of Congress to afford protection to secured interests.
7 4
The requirement would, however, thwart the congressional intent to create a
workable remedy by which an honest but overextended debtor can pay at
least a substantial portion of his debts, avoid the necessity of a discharge in
bankruptcy, and effect an equitable settlement among his creditors. A reasonable
approach in denying enforcement of liens has been taken by courts which require
substantially equivalent payments and no immediate reimbursement of overdue
installments.7 5
The realities of the situation would seem to indicate that secured creditors will
not be materially affected by a plan which provides for full, or nearly full, current
payments, but does not require immediate satisfaction of overdue payments.
Where the security is worth as much as the debt, the rights of a creditor who is
compelled to participate in an extension and who ultimately receives full pay-
ment will be impaired only to the extent that he is denied interest on the overdue
payments.7 6 Where the debtor is unable to complete payments under the plan
and obtains a discharge, the result of the denial of foreclosure on security
which has declined in marketable value, such that it is worth less than the
amount of the remaining debt, will be to cause a previously secured creditor to be
unsecured for a part of his debt. 77 This would be substantial impairment but
could be remedied by giving such creditors some priority, based on their rights
when foreclosure was denied, with respect to the amount for which they are
not secured. Where the security was worth less than the debt at the time that
foreclosure was denied, substantial payment will place the creditor in as good if
not a better position than immediate reclamation.78 Before wider use of Chapter
XIII is advocated, the appropriate status of all secured creditors should be
more clearly defined and, in so doing, an attempt should be made to reconcile
the rights of secured creditors with the avowed public policy of rehabilitating
debtors.
73. National Bankruptcy Conference, Analysis of H.R. 12889, supra note 56, at 106 n.1.
74. See Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 6439, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 9, at 53 (1937).
75. In the Matter of Wilder, 225 F. Supp. 67 (M.D. Ga. 1963).
76. For computing interest payments to secured creditors, see 3 Collier IT 63.16[1l.
77. Hilliard & Hurt, Wage Earner Plans Under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, 19
Bus. Law. 271, 279 (1963).
78. An inequitable situation will result if full payment is required where the security Is
not worth as much as the debt. The proper solution would be to treat the creditor as un-
secured for the debt in excess of the actual value of the security. See Brown, A Primer on
Wage-Earner Plans Under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, 17 Bus. Law. 682, 690-91
(1962).
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IV. THE PROPOSED AM1ENDMTENTS
The two bills pending in Congress, S. 61370 and H.R. 292, s ° would grant
referees discretionary power to compel consideration of a wage earner plan
before the court will adjudicate the debtor a bankrupt.
Chapter XIII plans are attempted by only a small percentage of the wage
earners who encounter financial difficulties,81 and, as indicated, the degree of
acceptance varies throughout the country. In New York, for example, less than
2 per cent of the eligible debtors actually undertook a Chapter XIII plan in
1963,82 while in Alabama, about 80 per cent of the eligible debtors actually
attempted a plan. 3 Several reasons are offered for the wide variance in accep-
tance, including lack of knowledge by the legal profession 13' and an adverse
attitude by some referees. 85 A recent study of a Michigan community indicates
that a genuine lack of desire to pay debts may account for the preference for
a discharge in straight bankruptcy, rather than adoption of a plan which en-
tails hardships.8 6 A fundamental reason for non-uniform acceptance of Chapter
XIII appears to be the varying degree to which states will allow garnishment
of wages., 7 In states such as Alabama, where creditors can avail themselves of
state laws to attach substantial portions of a debtor's wages," Chapter XIII
proceedings are more likely to be invoked than in states such as Texas and
Florida which do not allow any substantial attachment of wages.8 9
S. 613 would give the court power to compel a wage earner who has filed
a petition in straight bankruptcy, and who, of course, contemplates discharge,
to file a wage earner plan whenever it is "feasible and desirable, and for the
79. S. 613, S9th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
So. H.R. 292, S9th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
81. See note IS supra.
82. Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, at 271
(1964). a
83. Id. at 274. See also Driver, Proposal To Amend the Bankruptcy Act To Require that
Consideration Be Given to the Use of Chapter XIII, IS Pers. Fin. L.Q. 41, 46 (19f4).
84. Nadler, Rehabilitation of the Insolvent Wage Earner Under the Bankruptcy Act in
Florida, 10 U. Fla. L. Rev. 465, 470 (1957).
85. Chandler, The Wage Earners' Plan: Its Purpose, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 169, 170 (1961);
Walker, Is Chapter XIII a Milestone on the Path to the Welfare State?, 33 Ref. J. 7 (1959).
Chapter XIII is not a panacea for the debtor, and it is not the proper function of referees
to advise prospective bankrupts. Id. at 9.
86. Dolphin, An Analysis of Economic and Personal Factors Leading to Consumer
Bankruptcy 111-12 (1963); accord, Abramson, supra note 60, at 609, wvhere it is noted that
the prospective hardships of Chapter XIII cause wage earners to reject the idea.
37. Driver, supra note 33, at 43-44.
83. Ala. Code tit. 7, § 630 (1953) provides that twenty-five per cent of a person's wages
may be attached.
39. No wages can be attached in Texas. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4099 (1943). In Florida,
the head of a family is exempt from wage attachment. Fla. Stat. § 222.11 (1961). The effect
of these statutes on the use of Chapter XIII is discussed in Abramson, supra note C91, at C09;
Nadler, supra note 84, at 470-72.
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best interests of the creditors ... ,,o Under S. 613, a wage earner, having filed a
voluntary petition and applied for a discharge, may not only be denied adjudi-
cation as a bankrupt, but may also be compelled to undertake a Chapter XIII
plan.91 H.R. 292 would amend that section of the act under which the court
examines the debtor petitioning for adjudication, to allow the judge or referee
conducting the examination to dismiss the petition where the wage earner has
failed to show that "adequate relief cannot be obtained under chapter XIII
.... 92 While H.R. 292 avoids use of the word "mandatory" and is structured
in such a way as only to deny discharge, and not to compel a wage earner plan,
the effect of the bill would be to compel filing of a Chapter XIII petition, at
least in states which allow substantial garnishment of wages. Upon denial of a
petition for discharge, a debtor will be faced with the alternative of either allow-
ing creditors to invoke the remedies allowed by the state, or of seeking relief
through the bankruptcy court by submitting a Chapter XIII petition. Faced
with substantial garnishment of his wages, a debtor will effectively be presented
with no alternative to wage earner relief. 3
Adoption of "involuntary" Chapter XIII relief would be a significant depar-
ture from accepted tenets of bankruptcy. 4 While there is no constitutional right
to a discharge in bankruptcy,95 it is well established "that the aims of all bank-
ruptcy legislation are two, the distribution of property and the discharge of the
debtor, and that of the two, the latter is of equal, and perhaps of paramount
importance."9 6 Although a debtor has only a privilege, and not a right, to be
discharged from his debts, the qualifications which compulsory wage earner
plans would place on this privilege have caused severe criticism of the proposals.
The Judicial Conference has disapproved of the bills because the proposals "are
discriminatory in singling out a low-income group that would be compelled under
Chapter XIII to pay their debts in full."' 9 7 The charge of discrimination fails
to recognize that consumer bankrupts are, in fact, a distinct economic class and
their rights and obligations cannot necessarily be compared to those of other
bankrupts. Consideration should be given to the fact that straight bankruptcy
denies creditors access to the future wages of consumer debtors, the very
90. S. 613, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965).
91. While it may appear that a reluctant debtor could defeat the purpose of the bill by
deliberately defaulting and demanding his statutory right to discharge, the court has the
power to prevent intentional defaulting. See notes 50 & 51 supra and accompanying text.
92. H.R. 292, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965).
93. The House bill provides that notice be given to all creditors upon dismissal of a
petition for discharge in bankruptcy. It can be assumed that creditors, in states which allow
substantial garnishment of wages, will act upon such notice.
94. The historical trend of discharges in bankruptcy is discussed in National Bankruptcy
Conference, Analysis of H.R. 12889, supra note 56, at 117-18 n.1.
95. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 provides: "Congress shall have Power ...To establish ...
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States .... 1
96. National Bankruptcy Conference, Analysis of H.R. 12889, supra note 56, at 118 n.l.
97. 23 Legal Aid Brief Case 263 (1965), quoting from the reports of the U.S. Judicial
Conference on S. 613 & H.R. 292, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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"security" on which they have relied.03 The Conference further criticized the
amendments as being "unfair" in compelling a debtor to accept a plan without
placing equal compulsion upon secured creditors to accept it.P3 Without dis-
cussing the concept of "fairness," it would appear necessary, if Chapter XIII
is to be an effective remedy for both the debtor and the creditor, to enact new
statutory provisions for bringing secured creditors under the plan.
The National Legal Aid and Defender Association has opposed the amend-
ments on the ground that they "would not serve the best interests of indigent
persons .... "'1 This is certainly true to the extent that involuntary wage earner
plans will result in more debtors paying a larger percentage of their debts. This
is not valid criticism, however, if consideration is to be given to either the "best
interests" of creditors or to the advantages, such as avoiding the stigma of bank-
ruptcy, which accrue to the debtor upon successful completion of a wage earner
plan.
Legal Aid has also opposed the amendments on the ground that the discre-
tionary power given to the referees would "result in a lack of uniformity in the
administration of the Bankruptcy Proceeding ... ,no0 This is the most valid
criticism of the bills. While the very basis of an involuntary Chapter XIII pro-
ceeding presupposes someone exercising discretionary power to compel accep-
tance, more specific standards for exercising this discretion must be evolved than
have been provided for under the proposed amendments. 10 2 Under these provi-
sions, uniformity in the use of Chapter XIII would no more prevail than does
uniformity in various referees' calculations as to what is necessary to maintain
an adequate standard of living or to what extent creditors' interests should
prevail. The "feasibility and desirability" criteria appearing in the amendments
are as vague as the "adequate standard of living" criterion.
Significantly, proponents of the bill, while brandishing statistics which indicate
that as much as 25 to 50 per cent of voluntary bankrupts could have paid their
debts, 1 0 3 offer no explanation as to why about 80 per cent of the potential volun-
tary bankrupts in certain areas use Chapter XIII rather than seek a straight
discharge.10- The statistics indicate that some form of "compulsory" Chapter
I relief may already prevail in some areas of the country. 103 More precise
98. Mleth, Ethical and Economic Considerations in Chapter XII Proceedingi, 36 Ref. J.
41, 42 (1962).
99. 23 Legal Aid Brief Case 263 (1965), quoting from the reports of the US. Judicial
Conference on S. 613 & HR. 292, S9th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
100. National Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n, Summary of Proceedings of the 42d Annual
Conference 1S9 (1964).
101. Ibid.
102. See text accompanying notes 90 & 92 supra.
103. Twinem, Reduce Unnecessary Personal Bankruptcies: Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 23
Legal Aid Brief Case 252-53 (1965).
104. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
105. Walker, supra note S5, at 9. Referee Walker, recognizing the undue influence that a
referee can have on an unadvised debtor's choice of remedies, has stated: "We must remember
that when we speak, we speak to a captive audience, and we often fail to realize the impact
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standards are required not only in compelling the use of wage earner plans where
they are avoided, but also in preventing their being used where a complete and
immediate discharge in bankruptcy would be more appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
Although both amendments may be justified in attempting to compel wider
use of Chapter XIII, they are remarkably deficient in failing to deal with the
overall problems of consumer bankruptcy. Wage earner plans offer a potential
solution to this bankruptcy problem. However, no solution will come from a
loosely defined program under which the rights and obligations of the creditor,
the debtor, or the court are not clearly set out. It is not sufficient to incorporate
the general provisions of Chapters I through VII "where not inconsistent or in
conflict" with Chapter XIII. As in the case of the six year limitation on a sub-
sequent discharge, particular provisions are needed to affect the unique purpose
of wage earner plans. The status of secured creditors must be reconsidered,
eventually balancing their rights with the necessity of creating a workable plan
under which overextended debtors can find equitable relief. A thorough revision
and perhaps a re-evaluation of wage earner bankruptcy is necessary.*
which our persuasive tongues have upon our often not too intelligent listeners." Id. at 9.
(Footnote omitted.)
* In the Matter of Perry, 340 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1965), discussed at notes 27-33 supra
and accompanying text, was reversed by the Supreme Court immediately prior to publication.
Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 34 U.S.L. Week 4190 (U.S. March 7, 1966). The Court's
opinion employed, inter alia, the reasoning suggested herein. See text accompanying notes
29 & 30 supra.
